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Abstract: This paper offers an initial impact assessment regarding the 
introduction of new legislative responsibilities at the Land level in a case study 
of prisons policy (Strafvollzug). Combining an analysis of new legislation 
produced across the 16 Länder since the responsibility for prisons policy was 
transferred to the Land level, and insights into the mechanics of policy 
development obtained through a series of interviews with senior politicians 
and officials, this paper finds that the desire amongst Länder to legislative 
independently has varied, with substantial backing for co-ordination in the 
development of new legislation.  This has helped to confound expectations of 
a ‘competition of harshness’ which many expected to result from 
decentralisation. However, even before the 2006 reforms, there were 
substantial variations between the Länder when it came to implementing 





It has been widely argued that the sands of German federalism have shifted 
profoundly in the past three decades, particularly since reunification.1 Disparities 
between richer and poorer Länder have increased, and with this growing diversity 
have come pressures – in particular from wealthier Länder – for greater autonomy.  
One expression of these pressures was the decision in 2006 to pass responsibility 
for some areas of policy from the federal (national) government to the Länder.   This 
development was also a response to demands for clearer lines of responsibility, and 
fewer areas of ‘shared’ responsibility between different tiers of government (bringing 
with them the possibility of legislative gridlock in the Bundesrat).2 
 
In this contribution, we specifically assess the impact, some seven years since the 
reforms, of the decision to pass responsibility for prison legislation to the Länder.  
We aim to understand what impact passing legislative authority from the national to 
the Land level in Germany has had on prisons policy, and in particular the extent of 
any variation, and secondly to understand why policy has, or has not, diverged.  This 
was – as will be illustrated below – a contentious change, vehemently opposed by 
many politicians, civil servants, and professionals working in the sector.  In doing so, 
the aim is not merely to update our knowledge of the way in which German 
federalism operates, but also to contribute to our understanding of the effects which 
the decentralisation of responsibility for a particular area of policy might herald.   
 
                                                 
1 E.g. Jeffery, Charlie (Ed. 2014), Recasting German Federalism. The Legacies of Unification , London: Pinter; 
Jeffery, Charlie / Rowe, Carolyn (2014) 'The Reform of German Federalism', in Padgett, S., Paterson, W. and 
Zohlnhoefer, R. (eds.) Developments in German Politics (4th edition), Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp.XXX . 
2 E. Turner / C. Rowe, ‘“Party Servants, Ideologues or Regional Representatives? The German Länder and the 





Scholars and policy-makers alike are often seek to understand the impact of 
transferring power from one level of decision-making to another, and it is 
hypothesised that such a shift in responsibility brings with it particular consequences.  
Six potential impacts can be discerned from the relevant literature and are briefly set 
out below:  
 
1. A commonly-expressed variant is that of a ‘race to the bottom’, whereby a 
shift in responsibility from a national to a sub-national jurisdiction will lead to 
downward pressure on levels of service provision, regulation or taxation, as 
the sub-national jurisdictions seeks to gain competitive or political advantages 
from offering lower levels of provision than their neighbours.3  For instance, 
Peterson’s study of welfare benefits in the United States contends that ‘To 
recommend that the provision of welfare should be locally controlled and its 
marginal cost borne by state and local taxpayers is to recommend that the 
poor be all but abandoned’.4  He finds that states seek both to reduce 
spending on the politically unpopular project of welfare provision but also seek 
to avoid attracting recipients of benefits by having higher levels than those of 
their neighbours.  Concerns about a ‘race to the bottom’ have also been 
associated with regulatory policy (for instance, environmental taxation) and 
corporate taxation, where states seek to lower regulation or taxation in order 
to attract businesses to their territory.5 
2. An alternative variant is a ‘race to the top’, whereby levels of service provision 
or regulation will increase following decentralisation.  There are two 
mechanisms which may prompt such a ‘race’.  The first is where provision of a 
good is politically popular, so states compete to offer the greatest level of 
service – an effect which may be heightened where feelings of solidarity are 
greater within smaller jurisdictions, thus legitimising higher levels of service 
provision.6  The second mechanism relates to regulatory policy, whereby 
manufacturers based in a larger, powerful jurisdiction with higher levels of 
regulation will lobby for smaller jurisdictions to raise their regulation to the 
same level, to avoid any disadvantage vis-à-vis companies based in the 
smaller jurisdiction.7  
3. A ‘race to the middle’ scenario may occur, whereby states seek to avoid being 
outliers, and use levels of service provision, regulation or taxation in other 
states as a benchmark.8 
                                                 
3 E.g. Oates, Wallace E (1972): Fiscal Federalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanocich).  
4 Peterson, Paul E. (1995): The Price of Federalism (Washington: Brookings Institution). 
p. 128. 
5 Wilson, John D. (1996) “Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Is There a Theoretical Basis for a 
Race to the Bottom?”, in Bhagwati, J and Hudek R (eds.),  Harmonization and Fair Trade, volume 1 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 395–427.. 
6 Keating, Michael (2009), “Social Citizenship, Solidarity and Welfare in Regionalized and Plurinational 
States”, in Citizenship Studies, 13/5, pp. 501-513. 
7 Vogel, David / Kagan, Robert A. (2004): “Introduction: National Regulations in a Global Economy”, in 
Vogel, David / Kagan, Robert A.: Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Affects National 
Regulatory Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 1-41. 
8 Green, David A / Harrison, Kathryn (2006): ‘Races to the Bottom versus Races to the Middle: Minimum 
Wage Setting in Canada’, in Harrison, Kathryn (Ed.): Racing to the bottom?  Provincial Interdependence in the 




4. The ‘laboratories of democracy’ scenario, whereby states use new policy 
freedoms to experiment, and then compare and learn from each other, 
leading to diffusion of good practice, and avoidance of choices which have not 
proved their worth. 
5. The ‘parties matter’ scenario, whereby variations in policy will be driven by the 
composition of the government at the state level.  So for instance, a 
conservative government might use new flexibility in education policy to 
increase the level of selection in education, or a left-wing state government 
could increase spending on social programmes.9 
6. The ‘policy response to context’ scenario, whereby policies are adapted to ‘fit’ 
particular features of the state context.10  For instance states with 
conservative-minded populations might be expected on this analysis to adopt 
restrictive rules on the wearing of headscarves, while those with a particular 
problem of long-term unemployment would adapt labour market policy to 
focus on this particular group. 
 
There is, however, an alternative, which is that even after a shift in responsibility 
from the national level to the state level, policies do not change, and states do not 
take advantage of their new ability to introduce variation.  There are various ways 
this might be driven: 
 
1. By path dependence, whereby existing policies have built up support from 
public expectation or institutions able to defend the status quo, or more 
broadly where the costs of change outweigh any potential benefit.11   
2. By the absence of any of the above-mentioned drivers of policy variation 
(such as different political parties having different views, or differences in 
context).  
3. By a commitment to consistency of policy across the territory, either for 
normative reasons (a rejection of apparently arbitrary instances of 
inconsistency termed a ‘postcode lottery’ in the UK), or because variation 
would be feared to bring with it particular costs.  Examples of such costs 
might be confusion for consumers, as Reus notes was a concern in the case 
of smoking bans, or undermining the mutual recognition of qualifications 
across the territory, which is a frequent anxiety when federalism in the 
German education system is discussed.12   
 
Prisons policy offers several benefits as a case study in the impact of 
decentralisation.  First, it represents a clear transition of legislative authority: prior to 
the 2006 reforms, policy on prisons was exclusively a matter for the national 
government (although, typically in the German context, the Länder were responsible 
for policy implementation, namely the running of prisons as well as the issuing of 
relevant regulations).  Thereafter, sole responsibility transferred to the Länder, 
                                                 
9 Schmidt, Manfred G (1980): CDU und SPD an der Regierung: Ein Vergleich ihrer Politik in den Ländern 
(Frankfurt: Campus).  Turner, Ed (2011): Political Parties and Public Policy in the German Länder: When 
Parties Matter (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
10 E. Turner, Political Parties, J. von Blumenthal, Das Kopftuch in der Landesgesetzgebung: Governance im 
Bundesstaat zwischen Unitarisierung und Föderalisierung (2009, Nomos: Baden Baden). 
11 Pierson, Paul (2000): ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, in American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 94/2, pp. 251-267. 
12 Reus in this volume. 
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subject to conformity with the German Basic Law (constitution) and the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  Secondly, it is an area of some political controversy, 
with long-standing debates between ‘hardliners’ and ‘liberal reformers’.  Therefore, 
several of the possible policy developments alluded to above (such as competition to 
gain a political advantage by differentiating policies from neighbours, or divergence 
along partisan lines) might be expected.  Thirdly, it is useful precisely because much 
of the literature on the impact of decentralisation (as cited above) focuses on matters 
of regulation, taxation, or public expenditure on welfare entitlements and lessons 
have been drawn accordingly; it will be an excellent test of propositions developed 
for these policy areas to see whether they also stand up in an area which does not fit 
into these categories. 
 
This study draws upon four sources of evidence.  Laws on prisons, youth prisons, 
and investigative detention were collated for each of the sixteen Länder, and 
compared.  Second careful review of secondary literature, not only in academic texts 
and scholarly journals but also in the (highly useful) publication of the professional 
association of prison professionals, was conducted.  Thirdly, expert interviews were 
conducted with relevant actors in five Länder (with a mixture of larger and smaller, 
richer and poorer, Christian Democrat-led and Social Democrat-led, and eastern and 
western), including politicians and civil servants, namely Bavaria, Schleswig-
Holstein, Rhineland Palatinate, Thuringia and Berlin.  Parliamentary debates on 
proposed legislation in these cases were also examined. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides a 
brief exposition of the context of German prisons legislation prior to the 2006 
federalism reform.  Section three offers an account of the decision to transfer 
responsibility for prisons legislation from the federal government to the Länder.  
Section four presents the substantive findings, considering in turn laws on youth 
prisons, adult prisons and investigative detention.  Section five concludes– finding 
that variations in prisons legislation, while present, are more limited than was 
anticipated at the time of the reform, and with little evidence of the much-feared ‘race 
to the bottom’.  In no small measure, this is due to a clear normative commitment to 
avoid arbitrary policy variation amongst politicians, and in particular civil servants, 
involved.  However, there is substantial variation in the way prisons law is 
implemented in Germany, making scrutiny of what happens below the national level 
an important exercise. 
 
 
Prisons policy in Germany prior to 2006  
 
For much of the post-War period, there was no specific legislation governing the 
operation of prisoners and the treatment of prisoners.  Certain basic rights, starting 
with, in Article 1, the inviolability of human dignity, were enshrined in the Basic Law, 
which stated that these rights might only be modified in primary legislation, and that 
their essence could never be altered (Article 19).  However, it was initially accepted 
that some groups – such as minors, members of the armed forces, and prisoners – 
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were in a ‘special authority relationship’ to the state, and so their rights could indeed 
be restricted without primary legislation.13   
 
However, by the early 1970s the Federal Constitutional Court had twice stepped in to 
require a change of track.  In 1972, in a case on prisoners’ right to receive post, the 
Court ruled that ‘Basic rights of prisoners may only be restricted by or on the basis of 
a law’ and ‘… could only be considered when they are essential for the achievement 
of an aim of the community as specified in the Basic Law’.14  In 1973, flesh was put 
on these bones, in the Lebach judgement (concerning the right of a prisoner not to 
be named and pictured in a television documentary about his crime), which ruled that 
resocialisation of offenders had to be the primary objective of the implementation of 
prison sentences.15   
 
The government at the time – the Social-Liberal (SPD-FDP) coalition under 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Justice Minister Hans-Jochen Vogel – responded 
with the Federal Prisons Law of 1976, which not only required the aim of 
imprisonment to be to ‘enable the prisoner to lead a socially responsible life without 
committing criminal offences’, but also provided a detailed framework for the 
operation of prisons, covering such matters as day release, post, work and pocket 
money.   
 
Nonetheless, as Vogel himself observed in an interview in 1974, many important 
matters in the operation of prisons were questions of implementation, and solely the 
responsibility of the Länder: as he put it, ‘The law is not a panacea … in the 186 
prisons, not even the planned 143 doctors’ posts are actually filled, and there are 
major gaps in [other] personnel.  Here the national government cannot offer any 
immediate assistance.  The competence for this has been given by the Basic Law 
exclusively to the Länder’.16  A critical commentary half a decade later observed that 
provisions in the new law had been ‘simply ignored’, for instance concerning the 
level of pay for prisoners’ work, their enrolment in social insurance, and the 
availability of social therapy.17   
 
In 2006, and therefore prior to the federalism reform, scholars discerned substantial 
variations between the Länder in the implementation of prisons policy, 
notwithstanding the common legal framework.  In an essay entitled ‘Prisons policy as 
Land responsibility?  The “competition of harshness” is already happening’, Dünkel 
and Schüler-Springorum compare data in a range of areas, and find substantial 
variations across Germany.  In 2004, 32% of prisoners were in open prisons in 
Berlin, compared to 6.4% in Thuringia and 7.8% in Bavaria.  In the same year, 820 
agreed absences from prison per 100 prisoners were agreed in the Saarland, 
compared to 66.7 in Saxony-Anhalt.  While 15.7% of prisoners in Hamburg had to 
share a cell, 78.6% were required to do so in Thuringia.18  Some of these differences 
                                                 
13 F. Dünkel and D van Zyl Smit, ‘The Implementation of Youth Imprisonment and Constitutional Law in 
Germany’, Punishment & Society 9/3 (2007), pp. 347-69, here p. 348-50. 
14 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgement of 14.03.1972, 2. BvR 41/71. 
15 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Jugement of 05.06.1973,  1. BvR 536/72. 
16 Die Zeit, 30 August 1974, ‘Dampf in der Debatte: Ein Zeitgespräch mit Bundesjustizminister Hans-Jochen 
Vogel’, p.3. 
17 Der Spiegel, 25 October 1982, ‘Dreizehn Jahre geliehene Macht’, pp. 81-100. 
18 F. Dünkel / H. Schüler-Springorum, ‘Strafvollzug als Ländersache?  Der “Wettbewerb der Schäbigkeit” ist 
schon im Gange!’, Zeitschrift für Strafvollzug und Straffälligenhilfe 3 (2006), pp. 145-9. 
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could be accounted for by differences between eastern and western Länder (with 
different histories and also prison infrastructure) but by no means all.  Interviews with 
practitioners confirmed that – while analysis of the legal framework concerning 
prisons would be useful in and of itself, this only gives an incomplete picture of what 
actually happens within the walls of prisons in Germany.19 
 
Meanwhile, there was no particular legal framework concerning youth prisons, in 
spite of calls for primary legislation from the expert Commission on Youth 
Imprisonment, and various proposals from the Federal Ministry of Justice throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s (which were blocked by the majority of Länder).20  Instead, the 
1976 law was considered to apply also to youth detainees. 
 
In summary, then, for the period from the foundation of the Federal Republic of 
Germany until 2006, there was a common national legal framework concerning 
prisons, first provided in very general terms by the Basic Law, then by certain 
Federal Constitutional Court Verdicts, and from 1976 onwards by the Federal 
Prisons Law.  However, there were significant variations between the Länder in the 
way in which this law was implemented, thus reinforcing the view that territorial 
variation in Germany is more prevalent than is often assumed to be the case.21 
 
 
Discussion of prisons policy in the 2006 reform 
 
The decision to make prisons the exclusive competence of the Länder proved highly 
controversial, and critics argued that it lacked any sound rationale: while there might 
be some operational pressures leading to policy differentiation (such as the 
availability of open prison places), these would not require a different legal basis in 
each Land.  As noted above, such variations existed already – rather to the regret of 
professionals – in spite of the common federal law.  The phrase “competition of 
harshness” (Wettbewerb der Schäbigkeit) was often used by critics of the measure, 
who felt that Länder would out-bid each other in terms of being seen to punish 
prisoners, and also release funds for more popular purposes than serving prisoners’ 
needs.  This would indeed be a variation of downward competitive pressure, or ‘race 
to the bottom’, identified in the introduction.  
 
The federalism reform commission, which ran from 2002 to 2004, did not appear to 
consider a shift in responsibility for prisons law to the Länder for most of its 
deliberation, and the proposal only surfaced in late 2004, even though it had been 
explicitly rejected by the Länder only months before.22 
 
Only limited reasons in favour of the transfer can be discerned from relevant 
parliamentary debates.  Minister Wolfgang Reinhart from Baden-Württemberg 
argued that, as the Länder were responsible for paying for prisons, so the Länder 
should be responsible for the rules financing them.23  Bavaria’s Minister President, 
                                                 
19 Interview with recent governor of youth prison, Berlin, 17 October 2012. 
20 Dünkel and van Zyl Smit, ‘The Implementation of Youth Imprisonment’, p. 351. 
21 Jeffery Pamphillis etc JEPP. 
22 Schneider, Hans-Peter (2013), Der neue deutsche Bundesstaat: Bericht über die Umsetzung der 
Föderalismusreform I (Nomos: Baden-Baden), pp. 220-2. 
23 Bundesrat Protokoll, 7th July 2006, p. 221. 
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Edmund Stoiber, thought that debates on prisons policy would attract greater public 
attention if held in the Land parliaments,24 and Roland Koch from Hesse enthused 
about opportunities for policy experimentation, in an area where Germany had not 
distinguished itself.25     Peter Struck, the Parliamentary Leader of the SPD, 
appeared to justify the transfer of responsibility as a quid pro quo, which had not 
been wanted by his side, and something he would watch, to see there was not a 
‘race to the bottom’.26  Chancellor Angela Merkel referred obliquely to the desire to 
strengthen Land parliaments and subsidiarity.27  
 
A more plausible explanation for the shift emerged in interviews with protagonists.28  
There was intense frustration amongst some Länder, in particular Bavaria (and also 
to a degree the federal government), that it had proven impossible to reform prison 
law, with changes – such as hardline modifications put forward by Hesse, which 
would weaken the emphasis on rehabilitation of prisoners as a purpose of 
punishment – failing to find a majority, as  Länder led by the SPD were opposed.29  
Indeed, the same gridlock had been observed, in matters of youth justice, when the 
federal governments’ attempt at laws had been blocked (mostly on grounds of cost) 
by the majority of Länder in the Bundesrat on no fewer than four occasions in the 
1980s and 1990s.30 Thus, the shift of power from the national level to the Länder had 
much more to do with a desire to reduce the need for agreement by a majority of the 
Länder in the Bundesrat, and the federal parliament, than with functional or popular 
pressures for variation across the German territory. 
 
Nonetheless, there was a great deal of anger expressed at the changes.  A letter 
from twelve former ministers of justice, endorsed by the association of German 
judges, objected to inconsistency that would arise between different parts of the 
judicial process at different levels of government.31  An editorial in the Zeitschrift für 
Strafvollzug, a journal of prisons professionals, objected to a “fracturing” of prison 
law.  It pointed to the difficulty co-operation between Länder in accommodating 
particular groups if they had different prison laws; the difficulty of moving prisoners 
for security reasons from one Land to another, and the apparent injustice of two 
prisoners from different parts of Germany being arrested for a crime in Berlin, but 
being treated very differently when returned to their local Land on account of 
different laws there.32  
 
There was substantial opposition in both chambers of the legislature.  In the 
Bundestag, the Green MP Wolfgang Wieland called the lack of attention paid to 
                                                 
24 Bundesrat Protokoll, 7th July 2006, p. 205. 
25 Bundesrat Protokoll, 7th July 2006, p. 214. 
26 Bundestag Protokoll, 30th June 2006, p. 4240. 
27 Bundestag Protokoll, 30th June 2006, p. 4258. 
28 Interview, Bavarian negotiator, 5th December 2013. 
29 Die Welt, “Hessen fordert Wende zu mehr Härte beim Strafvollzug”, 25th February 2003. 
30 Duenkel / Van Zyl Smit p.351. 
31 “Deutscher Richterbung unterstützt Appell ehemaliger Justizminister gegen Verlagerung der 
Gesetzgebungskompetenz für den Strafvollzug”, Press Release, Deutscher Richterbund, 17th February 2006, 
available at http://www.drb.de/cms/index.php?id=81 (last consulted 3 June 2014). 
32 U. Kopp, ‘Keine Verlagerung der Gesetzgebungskompetenz für den Strafvollzug auf die Länder – 
Gesetzgebungskompetenz für den Strafvollzug muss beim Bund bleiben’, Zeitschrift für Strafvollzug und 
Straffälligenhilfe 1(2006), p. 3.   
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expert warnings “shameful and shocking”,33 while the former Federal Justice Minister 
and senior Liberal politician, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, said that the 
move was the “wrong step”, and that it could lead to the deletion of resocialisation as 
the aim of imprisonment.34  In the Bundesrat, similarly, several representatives of the 
Länder opposed the measure, with Erwin Sellering (from Mecklenburg Lower 
Pomerania), stating that it would be the end of “equality before the law”,35 and Ralf 
Stegner from Schleswig-Holstein, fearing a “competition of harshness”. 
 
Notwithstanding opposition from the Greens and Left Party, limited breakdown in 
party cohesion amongst members of the ruling grand coalition (with many more 
harbouring private reservations), and near-universal condemnation from prisoners 
professionals, the transfer of responsibility for prisons laws was indeed agreed in 
2006.  Heribert Prantl, a prominent commentator and prison reformer, dismissed 
reassurances that the Federal Constitutional Court would be able to keep 
unwarranted differential at bay, stating that: 
 
“In practice, the new situation will be uncontrollable for the highest court.  
Prison walls will get higher, and Karlsruhe [home of the Federal Constitutional 
Court] will be far away.  Even today, between aims and reality of prison lie 
increasing incarceration rates and overcrowding of prisons.  … [The reform] is 
a grave, historical mistake”.36 
 
 
Results: the impact of the 2006 federalism reform on prisons policy 
 
This section summarises the findings of our analysis of laws on prisons on the 2006 
reform.  We consider, firstly, laws on youth prisons (where legislation was passed in 
each Land as a result of a Federal Constitutional Court verdict), then laws on adult 
prisons, insofar as these exist, and finally provide a brief discussion of investigative 
detention.  In each case, we highlight differences between laws – insofar as they 
exist – but also account for similarities, based upon our interviews with actors 




As noted above, until 2006 there was no separate legislation concerning youth 
prisons in Germany, and instead these came under the Federal Prison Law.  Such a 
situation had long been criticised by experts – in particular reformers – and in 2006, 
the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that youth imprisonment required its own basis 
in primary legislation, in order to meet the particular requirements of young people.37  
Thus, the Länder needed to act, and act quickly, in order to resolve this situation – 
the Court set a deadline of the end of 2007 for them to comply. 
 
There were three different reactions amongst the sixteen Länder.  In three cases, 
Bavaria, Lower Saxony, and Hamburg (each of which were led by Christian 
                                                 
33 Bundestag Protokoll, 30th June 2006, p. 4261, 
34 Bundestag Protokoll, 30th June 2006, p. 4269. 
35 Bundesrat Protokoll, 7th July 2006, p. 220. 
36 H. Prantl, “Das Hexeneinmaleins des Strafvollzugs”, Forum Strafvollzug 1(2007), p. 22. 
37 Dünkel and van Zyl Smit, ‘The Implementation of Youth Imprisonment’, p. 351. 
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Democrats), new Prisons Laws were created, with its own section on youth prisons.  
In a further four cases (North-Rhine Westphalia, Hesse, Baden-Württemberg and 
Saxony – again all led by Christian Democrats) separate youth prisons laws were 
created.  The remaining nine Länder (including all the ones led by Social Democrats) 
decided to cooperate at the level of civil servants, and work on a Musterentwurf (a 
model draft of legislation), which could then be agreed to, subject to any variations 
wanted by the Land parliament, in each Land.38   
 
In terms of process, there was thus a clear difference between those Länder which 
wanted to use their new found opportunity to formulate their own, distinctive new law, 
and those who committed to collaborate with other Länder on new laws, in a process 
which would, necessarily, keep differences to a minimum.  Since Christian 
Democrats had been distinctly more enthusiastic about decentralising this policy 
area than their Social Democratic counterparts, it should be no surprise that only 
Christian Democrat-led Länder chose to develop their own laws, with each SPD-led 
land becoming involved in the Musterentwurf process.  As the CSU’s prisons 
spokesperson said “What’s the point of having a federalism reform, if you then have 
a Musterentwurf?”39  Of course, there would be every point if the principle of the 
federalism reform, with a desire to allow diversity in the legal framework, was not 
accepted. It is also worth noting that the larger Christian Democrat-led Länder (such 
as Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Lower Saxony, Hesse, and North-Rhine 
Westphalia) went their own way, while most of their smaller counterparts (such as 
Saxony-Anhalt and the Saarland) chose to co-operate.  This could point to different 
levels of capacity in drafting legislation, appetite to plough their own policy furrow, or 
indeed pressure to cooperate in day-to-day prisons policy with neighbours. 
 
The process of drawing up the Musterentwurf was led by civil servants – generally, 
but not necessarily, the Director (Abteilungsleiter) in the Ministry.  To a degree, even 
Länder not formally part of the process took an interest.  Crucially, politicians only 
became involved at the very end of the process, when the Musterentwurf went to 
Justice Ministers for any amendments prior to presentation to the Land’s cabinet and 
then parliament.  Thus, dominance of the executive (sometimes a feature of 
decision-making in the Bundesrat which generated disapproval) was reinforced.  It 
might have been expected that the Musterentwurf process would save time for each 
Land, but a participant interviewed suggested the opposite was the case – it took 
longer, but led to greater rigour and probing of possible consequences, as well as a 
more co-ordinated outcome.40  A Social Democratic politician suggested in an 
interview that working from a Musterentwurf also bought a party political benefit, as 
criticisms from the CDU opposition could be dismissed with a reference to the fact 
that some Christian Democrat Länder had identical provisions in their own laws.41 
 
On the substance of the laws, we identify five particular areas of difference between 
the laws, setting out the major differences between them.  These dimensions are 
                                                 
38 In fact, Saxony was initially part of the Musterentwurf process, but dropped out, apparently as it did not want 
to fund the pocket money it would have needed (interview with civil servant, 5 November 2012). 
39 Interview with Land politician, 3rd December 2013. 
40 Interview with civil servant, 5th November 2012. 
41 Interview with Land politicians, 7th November 2012. 
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amongst those considered in existing expert analyses.42 They are based on our own 
analysis of the laws passed.43 
 
Aims of punishment: As discussed above, Hesse had previously attempted to 
redefine the aims of punishment, so that protection of the community would have 
greater prominence, rather than resocialisation of offenders.  However, the Federal 
Constitutional Court verdict of 2006 set rather strict parameters in this regard, by 
making it clear that only by resocialisation could the community be protected.44  Two 
Länder, Bavaria and Hamburg, identify two functions of youth prison, namely 
protection of the community – which is mentioned first in both cases – and 
resocialisation of offenders.  Baden-Württemberg follows a similar logic (though they 
are a long way apart in the legal text, and it is not immediately clear which has 
priority).  Lower Saxony emphasises the equivalence of resocialisation and 
protection of the community, while the remaining Länder (Hesse, North-Rhine 
Westphalia, Saxony and those signed up to the Musterentwurf) all gave primacy to 
the aim of resocialisation, while giving ‘protection of the community’ equivalence as a 
function.  This was, therefore, an area where some – but only some – Christian 
Democrat-led Länder chose deliberately to ‘fly a conservative flag’.45   
  
Entitlement to single cells: In all Land laws, there is some level of commitment to 
providing prisoners with single cells (considered important in particular in the context 
of a murder in Siegburg youth prison in 2006).46  However, in each case there are 
opportunities for this not to be observed, either where a shared cell is in the 
prisoner’s interest (e.g. fears for the prisoner’s health), or temporarily for other 
operational reasons.  In most Länder, though, single cells must otherwise be offered. 
There are four variations upon this line: Bavaria has a substantially weaker 
entitlement to a single cell, under which prisoners ‘should’ have a single cell, rather 
than this being a requirement; Baden-Württemberg and Hamburg also state that 
prisoners ‘should’ have a single cell, but with more exceptions under which a single 
cell must be offered (in the former case, in new prisons single cells must be offered, 
in the latter, exceptions from when prisoners ‘should’ be offered a single cell are 
more limited).  In Berlin, the legislation set a deadline of the end of 2012, after which 
‘operational reasons’ would no longer justify a breach of the requirement for single 
cells.  Again, in this area, we see party politics appearing to play a role, with some 
CDU-led Länder offering less generous provisions for prisoners, and a slightly more 
liberal line being taken by the SPD-Left Party coalition in Berlin. 
 
                                                 
42 T. Höynck, N. Hagemann, B.-M. Kapteina, K. Klimaschewski, V. Lübke, N. Luu, F. Riechey, 
‘Jugendstafvollzugsgesetze der Länder: Eine Auswahl wichtiger Regelungsbereiche in synoptischer 
Darstellung’, Zeitschrift für Strafvollzug und Straffälligenhilfe. 57(2/2008): pp. 159-66; J. Feest / K. Bammann, 
‘Jugendstafvollzugsgesetze: Anspruch und Umsetzung’, in B. Dollinger / H. Schmidt-Semisch (eds, 2010), 
Handbuch Jugendkriminalität: Kriminologie und Sozialpädagogik im Dialog (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag), pp. 535-
43; Ostendorf, H.  (Ed, 2012, 2nd edition): Jugendstafvollzugsrecht: Kommentierte Darstellung  der einzelnen 
Jugendstrafvollzugsgesetze (Baden-Baden: Nomos); F. Dünkel / A. Pörksen, ‘Stand der Gesetzgebung zum 
Jugendstafvollzug und erste Einschätzungen’, Neue Kriminalpolitik (2/2007), pp. 55-67. 
43 A comprehensive collection of all laws is available in Handbuch Strafvollzug der Länder 2013/14 
(Regensburg: Walhalla Verlag). 
44 Feest / Bammann, ‘Jugendstrafvollzugsgesetze’, p. 536. 
45 Feest / Bammann, ‘Jugendstrafvollzugsgesetze’, p. 537. 
46 Dünkel / Pörksen, ‘Stand der Gesetzgebung’, p. 60 
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Open and closed prisons: This is another area where there is some variation in the 
new laws.  In the Musterentwurf, and in the laws of Saxony and North Rhine 
Westphalia, open and closed prisons are presented as equal options. North Rhine 
Westphalia goes further with its endorsement of open prisoners, with a requirement 
to move a prisoner to an open prison if it is appropriate; in the other cases, a 
prisoner “should” be transferred if appropriate.  By contrast, and with slightly different 
formulations, Hamburg and Hesse give priority to closed prisons, while noting that a 
prisoner “can” be moved to an open prison under some circumstances; Bavaria and 
Lower Saxony also have as a default closed prisons, but prisoners “should” move to 
an open prison if appropriate.  Baden-Württemberg’s law also contains a difference: 
the Land had adopted a pilot of youth custody, whereby it would occur in an 
institution run by youth services, and this is explicitly referred to in the Land’s law 
alongside open and closed prisoners.  With the exception of Bavaria, and Hamburg, 
each of the Länder also refers to this possibility, while affording it less prominence.  
So here we again appear to see a party political pattern, with some CDU/CSU-led 
Länder adopting more ‘hardline’ laws, but we also see regional path dependence, 
since Baden-Württemberg chose to reflect its (successful) experience with 
alternative forms of detention in its law. 
 
Accommodation in living groups (Wohngruppen): In youth prisons, it was often 
felt that accommodating prisoners in small groups where they would spend their time 
(when not in individual cells) was desirable, and the initial draft law from the Federal 
Justice Ministry specified this as being what should happen ‘regularly’. A maximum 
size of these groups was, in that draft, set at eight prisoners.  There is now some 
variation in the extent to which this model finds endorsement in the laws of the 
Länder.  The Länder following the Musterentwurf, and also Saxony and Hesse, stuck 
with the formulation proposed by the federal justice ministry, albeit without stating the 
maximum group size (apparently at the request of Land finance ministries), except in 
the case of Hesse (which followed the Federal Justice Ministry’s proposal on size).47  
Baden-Württemberg, Lower Saxony, and Hamburg used a weaker formulation, 
stating that suitable prisoners ‘should’ be accommodated in living groups.  Hamburg 
also mentions a minimum size of 8, and maximum of 15 prisoners.  Bavaria has the 
weakest formulation, stating that ‘appropriate’ prisoners ‘can’ be accommodated in 
living groups. 
 
Access to therapy: All the Land laws refer to the possibility of access to therapy 
while serving their sentences, but there are variations in the extent to which each 
prisoner has a legal entitlement to it.  In most Länder, laws state that prisoners ‘can’ 
be accommodated in a social therapy institution; however, this is stronger in 
Rhineland-Palatinate, where the draft law was amended by parliamentarians to say 
that prisoners ‘should’ have an entitlement to therapy; in Bavaria, Hamburg and 
Lower Saxony, there is a legal requirement to provide therapy in certain 
circumstances.   
 
The details given above refer to the laws at the time they were passed; clearly, 
legislators may undertake amendments from time to time (and indeed some Länder 
have now included youth prisons in revised prison laws).  The revisions in Hamburg 
have, however, been particularly interesting.  In 2008, it held an election in which the 
                                                 
47 Dünkel / Pörksen, ‘Stand der Gesetzgebung’, p. 62. 
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CDU, which previously had an overall majority, lost ground and needed to form a 
coalition.  It did so with the Green Party / Alternative List, and the Greens then took 
control of the Ministry for Justice.  A new law on prisons swiftly followed, which led to 
a more liberal line being taken on such issues as open prisons (to which appropriate 
inmates ‘should’ be transferred) and entitlement to single cells.48 
 
In summary, then, there are three conclusions that can be drawn in relation to youth 
prisons laws.  First, the laws are in essence quite similar, with only limited areas of 
substantial difference; this is particularly the case, unsurprisingly, where Länder 
chose to co-operate on drawing up the new law.  Secondly, what differences there 
were often appear attributable to party politics, with some, but only some, Christian 
Democrat Länder keen to put down a conservative marker.  In Hamburg, such 
markers were promptly reversed when the Green Party took over the justice ministry.  
Thirdly, as in the case of Baden-Württemberg’s provision for alternative provision of 
youth custody other than in a prison, Land-specific factors shaped the laws to a 




At the time of writing, not all Länder had produced an adult prison law.  As noted 
above, Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Lower Saxony and Hamburg created laws on 
prisons, incorporating provisions on youth prisons, within the timescale required for 
the latter by the Federal Constitutional Court.  Hesse passed its own law on adult 
prisons in 2010.  All the remaining Länder, with the exception of North-Rhine 
Westphalia, were part of a working group to create a Musterentwurf (or model law), 
published in 2011, although so far this has only resulted in legislation being passed 
in Rhineland-Palatinate, the Saarland, Brandenburg, Saxony, and Mecklenburg 
Lower Pomerania.  So, even eight years after the reform, the old Federal Prisons 
Law is still in force in six Länder, including the largest, North-Rhine Westphalia.49 
 
As in the case of youth justice, there are variations on a number of questions 
perceived by politicians to be of ‘symbolic’ importance, and these are discussed 
briefly below (again based on our analysis of the laws).  However, it is also striking 
that there are very substantial areas of similarity between the new laws (and indeed 
between these and the old Federal Prisons Law). 
 
Aims of punishment: As in the case of youth prisons, there is some variation in the 
definition of the aims of punishment.  Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg mention the 
protection of the community first (and only then resocialisation of offenders); the 
Musterentwurf (and those laws upon which it is based) put resocialisation first, and 
then mentions that protection of the community is also a function of prison; a similar 
formulation is adopted by Lower Saxony.  Hamburg does the same, but emphasises 
the equal importance of this function to resocialisation.   
 
Open and closed prisons: Again, there are similarities to the situation with youth 
prisons in whether a Land regards open or closed prison as the ‘normal’ form of 
punishment.  Bavaria and Lower Saxony both make closed prison the norm, though 
                                                 
48 F. Dünkel / J. Kühl, ‘Neuregelung des Strafvollzugs in Hamburg’, Neue Kriminalpolitik 21 (3/2009), pp. 82-6. 
49 Handbuch Strafvollzug der Länder; Schneider, Der neue deutsche Bundesstaat, pp. 224-5. 
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in the latter case a prisoner ‘should’ be transferred to an open prison if certain criteria 
are met; Hesse views open prison as a relaxation of prison conditions (away from 
the ‘default option’ of closed prison); while all the other laws passed, the 
Musterentwurf, and the old Federal Prisons Law do not mention a particular ‘default’, 
but state that a prisoner ‘should’ be housed in an open prison if he or she meets 
certain conditions.   
 
While the wording of the law might be of symbolic importance, the differences do 
appear to reflect differing attitudes to open prison.  Bavaria, for instance, has had the 
lowest proportion of prisoners in open prisons throughout the 1990s and 2000s 
(8.1% in 2009, compared to an average for the western Länder of 18.5%).  In Hesse, 
the proportion is 9.5% - though in 1996 it was 27.3%, before the Land swung to the 
right politically, with the election of a hardline, CDU-led government.  Of the Länder 
with a more harshly-worded law, only Lower Saxony confounds expectations, with 
20.8% in open prisons in 2009, just above the average.50  Equally, the presence of 
such wide variation between the Länder reminds us that variation in prisons policy 
existed prior to the federalism reform of 2006. 
 
Breaks from imprisonment for those serving life sentences: One topic 
mentioned in interviews, and which attained a certain media profile, was the stage at 
which inmates serving life sentences would be considered for a break from 
imprisonment.  Most prisoners, according to the laws of each Land, can be 
considered for this, but under the Federal Prisons Law this could not be considered 
within the first ten years of a sentence for those serving a life term; this was adopted 
by Hesse, Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Lower Saxony and Hamburg.  The 
Musterentwurf reduced this to five years, but this was one of just two proposals from 
civil servants which failed to find favour with politicians: in Rhineland-Palatinate, the 
Saarland, Saxony and Mecklenburg Lower Pomerania, politicians chose to stick with 
the ten-year rule.  Only in Brandenburg – with its Justice Minister from the Left Party 
– did the decision differ, with no particular stipulation beyond the prison authorities 
considering it appropriate.     
 
Duty to work: The other area where civil servants working on the Musterentwurf 
differed from leading politicians was in whether prisoners should be face a duty to 
undertake work.  The duty was a feature of the Federal Prisons Law, and also the 
five laws passed by CDU / CSU-led Länder.  However, the Musterentwurf proposed 
dispensing with it: in Rhineland-Palatinate, Brandenburg, and Saxony, this advice 
was followed; in Mecklenburg Lower Pomerania, the duty was retained, while in the 
Saarland, the ‘duty’ was abolished, but instead prisoners could be ‘compelled’ to 
work.  Opponents of the duty to work argued that the European Court of Human 
Rights saw work as a reward for good behaviour and that it should not be used as a 
punishment; moreover, in practice there was a shortage of work so it was rarely 
refused, and indeed it was considered less challenging than undertaking therapy.51  
Supporters of the duty to work pointed to its value in achieving resocialisation, and 
also the need to retain the infrastructure of prison employment (which would be lost, 
                                                 
50 F. Dünkel / B. Geng / C. Morgenstern, ‘Strafvollzug in Deutschland: Aktuelle rechtstatsächliche Befunde’, 
Forum Strafvollzug (1/2010)  pp. 20-32, here p. 29. 
51 Interview with civil servant, 5th November 2012; ‘Pro und Contra Arbeitspflicht’, Forum Strafvollzug 
(4/2012), pp. 223-4. 
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they argued, if the duty was deleted, as states would choose to save money by not 
providing employment for the prisoners with the least experience of work).52    
 
Participation: The old Federal Prisons Law (paragraph 160) stated that it ‘should’ 
be made possible for prisoners to ‘take responsibility for issues of common concern’.  
There was some legal debate about the extent to which this required prisons to 
establish some sort of representative body.  In Hesse, Lower Saxony, the 
Musterentwurf and those laws based upon it, there is now reference to a 
representative body, but it remains on that basis that one ‘should’ be established, 
rather than a firm legal requirement.  Only in Hamburg’s law is the requirement to 
allow prisoners to take some responsibility binding.  In Lower Saxony and the 
Musterentwurf (and laws based upon it), the prison authorities should discuss 
proposals coming from prisoners through this route, whereas in Bavaria and Hesse, 
prisoners are just entitled to put forward their points.53   
 
In summary, then, legislation on adult prisons demonstrates, first, that the majority of 
Länder have been in no rush at all to deviate from the old federal law and plough 
their own furrow – with such enthusiasm only being detected amongst some 
Christian Democrat-led Länder.  It is particularly striking that North Rhine 
Westphalia, the largest Land, has not yet passed its own law on adult prisons.  
Moreover, ten Länder chose to cooperate on a new law, through the Musterentwurf 
process, preferring a process of harmonisation (led by civil servants) to 
differentiation.  Secondly, there are, nonetheless, still some differences, but these 
appear to be concentrated to a significant degree on issues of symbolic importance, 
such as the aims of punishment, the status accorded to open prisons, and the duty 
to work.  While there are variations in Germany in the availability of work in prisons, 
and in particular in the proportion of prisoners accommodated in open prisons, these 
existed before the different legislation.  Finally, some commentators have regretted 
the extent to which the new laws are vague in terms of personnel and structural 
requirements for prisons, so that potential improvements will be ‘torpedoed by 




The lack of appetite for variation in laws across the territory is particularly striking 
when laws on investigative detention (Untersuchungshaft) are considered.  As with 
youth justice, the Federal Constitutional Court required the Länder to produce laws.  
Lower Saxony included this area in its wider prisons law of 2007; 12 Länder formed 
a group to create a Musterentwurf, and while the remaining four Länder (Bavaria, 
Baden-Württemberg, Lower Saxony and North-Rhine Westphalia) were not part of 
this process, in practice their laws were quite similar.  Certainly, the laws are similar 
in format, and indeed Schneider contends that ‘there are no differences worth 
                                                 
52 ‘Pro und Contra Arbeitspfllicht’, interview with trade union official, 4th December 2013; interview with trade 
union official, 6th January 2013. 
53 F. Drohsel, ‘Interessenvertretung von Gefangenen – ein vernachlässigter Baustein der Strafvollzugsreform’, 
Forum Strafvollzug (5/2012), pp. 293-8. 
54 Ziethener Kreis, ‘Neue Strafvollzugsgesetze: Nur gut gemeint reicht nicht!’, Neue Kriminalpolitik (3/2012), 
pp. 85-6, here p. 86; also K. Drenkhahn, ‘Was bringt der Musterentwurf zum Landesstrafvollzugsgesetz?’, 
Forum Strafvollzug (5/2011),  p. 266. 
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mentioning’.55  Feest and Pollähne point to a few areas of divergence, such as 
pocket money and length of visits (where Lower Saxony’s law is more restrictive than 
those elsewhere), although their greater concern is with legal uncertainty about the 
boundaries to Land competencies (since the federal government retains some 




At the time of the federalism reform, the shift in responsibility for prisons law was the 
source of surprise and consternation in equal measure: surprise, because it had not 
been seen as a major demand of the Länder, and consternation, because there were 
substantial anxieties about a ‘race to the bottom’, with a ‘battle for the harshest 
punishment’ being waged by Land politicians.  There were also concerns about an 
apparent injustice, whereby prisoners in different Länder convicted of the same 
crime would be treated differently.   
 
There are several clear messages which emerge from our findings.  First, there has 
been no race to the bottom, in spite of fears to the contrary.  Not only is this broadly 
confirmed by our empirical findings in the foregoing chapter, but it was accepted by 
every single practitioner we spoke to in the field,57 and even by some of the experts 
who had been most critical of the proposals.  For instance, scholar Johannes Feest, 
while remaining critical, entitled an essay on the Musterentwurf on adult prisons ‘A 
Musterentwurf not without value’, which concludes: 
 
‘If [the law] is consistently implemented by the Länder and is not watered 
down by amendments and restrictive administrative decisions, then the fears 
at the time of the federalism reform of a “dog’s dinner” and a “competition of 
harshness” will have, at least in part, have been banished.  The 
Musterentwurf is admittedly miles away from the big hopes of a prison reform.  
But times are apparently such that one is happy when things don’t turn out 
quite as badly as feared.’58 
 
In a similar vein, Frieder Dünkel (one-time author of an essay entitled ‘The farce of 
the federalism reform’59) and his collaborators conclude that ‘The initially feared 
“competition of harshness” has not happened so far, on the contrary, some Länder 
have made substantial investments, above all in youth prisons and therapy’, and 
even refer to a ‘competition for best practice’.60   
 
                                                 
55 Schneider, Der Neue Deutsche Bundesstaat, p. 277. 
56 J. Feest / H. Pollähne, ‘Haftgründe und Abgründe: Eine Zwischenbilanz zur Untersuchungshaftgesetzgebung’, 
Forum Strafvollzug (1/2009), pp. 30-32. 
57 E.g. interview with trade union official, 4th December 2013; interview with civil servant, 5th November 2012; 
interview with civil servant, 31st October 2012; interview with civil servants, interview with Land politicians, 7th 
November 2012. 
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StVollzG2’, Neue Kriminalpolitik (1/2012), pp. 5-8, here p.8. 
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Secondly, we see substantial differences between the Länder in their appetite for 
variation in this policy area.  While a few – Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg, 
Hesse, and Lower Saxony (at the time, all led by Christian Democrats) were keen to 
legislate autonomously, others have been far keener to collaborate with other 
Länder, with joint drafts of legislation.  This should, perhaps, not be a surprise, given 
the shared disdain for decentralisation of the legislative responsibility amongst many 
civil servants and politicians, as well as the relatively tight parameters set on prison 
laws by both the Basic Law and verdicts of the Federal Constitutional Court.  It is 
also striking that in the area of adult prisons, several Länder, including the largest 
(North-Rhine Westphalia) are still relying on the old federal legislation eight years on, 
and have not passed their own law.   
 
Thirdly, where differences between the laws are observed, quite often they appear to 
be around issues of symbolism, possibly affecting relatively few prisoners, such as 
the aims of punishment, or whether open or closed prison is, in legal terms, regarded 
as the default.  Here, some Christian Democrat politicians – in government and in 
some Länder in opposition – sought to emphasise their conservative values, 
although this desire was not universally shared: several CDU-led Länder adopted the 
Musterentwurf on youth prisons with little modification, for instance.  There are 
occasional variations due to Land context – particularly evident, for instance, in 
Baden-Württemberg’s youth prisons law, and there is modest evidence, too, of other 
Länder seeking to learn from this experience.  There is also some evidence of Land 
politicians taking a greater interest in this policy area, and being willing to invest 
extra funds as a result.61   
 
Fourth, the federalism reform did ensure that Länder were able to legislate in areas 
which, hitherto, had been left untouched due to a stand-off between the federal 
government and the Bundesrat: indeed, if, as suggested in the introduction, reducing 
the number of veto players in this policy area to facilitate legislation was behind the 
transfer of responsibility, it has been a success, with laws being passed in all areas 
demanded by the Federal Constitutional Court, but also in the area of adult prisons 
in several Länder after an impasse spanning decades at the federal level. 
 
Fifth, there were some suggestions that the federalism reform had made it harder, 
rather than easier, for Länder to co-operate.  A senior prison trade union official 
expressed frustration at the costly failure of Länder to cooperate, giving the 
examples of Berlin’s refusal to cooperate with Brandenburg on part of the youth 
prisons estate, and a failed plan to co-operate on youth prisons between Saxony, 
Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia, and took the view that ‘German (prison) federalism is 
a synonym for burning money’!62   
 
There is a final, crucially important, conclusion, which points to the limits of this 
study.  While we have examined prison laws, and found substantial areas of 
similarity, it is clear that in such areas as the proportion of prisoners in open vs. 
closed prisons, levels of staffing, occupancy levels, and levels of expenditure per 
prisoner, there are still wide variations between the Länder, and thus the ‘injustice’ – 
if it is one – of prisoners being treated differently across the territory, is real.  This 
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happened before the federalism reform, but differentiation between the laws may 
well legitimate and entrench such differences. 
 
Our analysis of prisons law in Germany since 2006 has, therefore, called into 
question bold claims about the impact of decentralisation, which see inevitable ‘races 
to the bottom’, or indeed wide scope for experimentation and policy learning.  
Instead, two key points emerge.  On the one hand, it was widely feared that there 
would be a ‘race to the bottom’ in prisons law if the competence was passed to the 
Länder, and that has not happened.  Instead, there has been a high level of 
coordination between most Länder, with some divergence driven by context and, in 
particular, differences in party politics.  The appetite to take advantage of the new 
ability to legislate also varied widely, with a few Länder far more interested than the 
rest. 
  
On the other hand, there is substantial variation in the way prisoners are treated 
depending upon which of the Länder they are incarcerated in, and so one of the 
premises of this collection – that it is important to look at politics and policy below the 
national level – is still confirmed.  This variation predated the federalism reform of 
2006, and stemmed from administrative decisions, as well as differences in 
infrastructure and budget, at the level of the Länder.  It is thus an important reminder 
that if only legislation, and not policy implementation, is the object of analysis, 
important variation in policies may be neglected – a point which could apply just as 
much to unitary as to federal states. 
